Abstract-Recently, secure query has become a significant issue for researchers. It proposes the concept of secure multi-party query in Internet of things or sensor networks making use of " underground parties " to guarantee network security. Based on a novel network model assumption, it adopts homomorphic privacy and secure multi-party computation techniques to realize the above mentioned secure query, and then it puts forward the horizontal and vertical query algorithm in the top-k query through cooperation of underground parties. Thereafter, by the simulation tests it compares the time efficiency of the proposed algorithm with other typical sort algorithms under different top-k scenarios. At last, it analyzes the relationship between query time and number of underground party nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advancement in wireless communication and radio frequency technology has enabled the Internet of things to touch upon every aspect of our life, which is composed of wireless sensor network infrastructure in sensing layer [1] . This infrastructure may monitor the environment surrounding us and provide information for us to analyze and respond. Since it may collect all kinds of data from individual, security and privacy become a bottleneck that restrains the development of Internet of things. Secure query in the Internet of things or sensor networks has gained much attention recently in the research community. Traditional approaches of secure query are applied in a two-tiered network model [2] [3] which consists of a large number of resource-constrained sensor nodes in the lower tier and fewer relatively resource-rich storage nodes in the upper tier.
However, the inclusion of storage nodes who are mainly responsible for collecting multiple sensor data, may arouse more security and privacy problems. Due to their significant role in the network, they may easily become the objective of attackers and they are more vulnerable to be compromised. This paper mainly focus on wireless sensor network which is a typical network in sensing layer of Internet of things. Using the underground party nodes in the sensing layer we construct a novel network model to solve the security and privacy-preserving query problems. Meanwhile we propose a homomorphic privacy scheme between the underground party nodes and common sensor nodes, which can safeguard the security and privacy of the whole wireless sensor network. Besides, it also explains how the underground party nodes work synergistically to accomplish the security guarantee missions.
II. RELATED WORK
Secure queries in sensor networks have been extensively studied in prior researches [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The majority of these researches adopted the architecture of two-tiered sensor networks, where a large number of resourceconstrained sensor nodes in the lower tier and fewer relatively resource-rich storage (or master) nodes in the upper tier, has been widely adopted. In the two-tiered sensor networks, storage nodes collect data from sensor nodes and answer the queries from base station. Once storage nodes are compromised, it may disclose the stored sensor data to the adversary and send a wrong query result to base station. Hence, most of schemes proposed in the previous researches have mainly focused on protecting sensor data privacy and verifying the integrity of query result. Sheng and Li in [2] utilized a bucket partitioning technique to strike a balance between data confidentiality and query efficiency and employed encoding numbers to enable the network owner to validate the reply. Shi and Zhang proposed a novel spatiotemporal crosscheck approach aiming to reduce the communication cost [3] . In [4] [5] it extend S&L's scheme to handle multi-dimensional data through dividing the domain of each dimension into multiple buckets. Recently in [6] [7] they further investigate techniques suitable for the secure queries in event-driven two-tiered WSNs.
Nevertheless, there are some defects in this two-tiered architecture. Firstly, in the two-tiered sensor network, storage nodes need to directly communicate with base station vie long range radio transmission. However, it is quite inefficient and infeasible for energy constrained sensor nodes to transmit the data only by one hop. Secondly, the two-tiered sensor network is not the actual data routing structure in WSNs, which inevitably need some adjustments in combining these schemes into other WSN's techniques. Thirdly, the wireless sensor network is a decentralized and dynamic distributed system. The nodes in WSNs can join in or leave from the system at any time. Hence fixed settlement of the two-tiered sensor works is undesirable.
The majority of the above mentioned researches adopt the bucket scheme. The main idea of this scheme is that before transmission each sensor node first divides domain of raw data into multiple buckets and then attaches to the encrypted data a tag. When the base station needs to process a query over the data stored in the storage nodes, it first obtains an approximate result based on the tags corresponding to the query [2] . From a more general point of view, the bucket scheme has some drawbacks. To begin with, it requires each sensor node to know the each bucket's range value and its relevant tags. All these bucket information need to be stored in the sensor nodes before the query process, which need certain memory spaces and impose some extra pressure on the sensor node. Second, the setting and update of each bucket range value in a proper and secure manner is of great importance to the bucket scheme, which may influence the effectiveness and secure of query, for the query process may involve several buckets. Moreover, when there are several different sensitive data corresponding to the same bucket and the query covers several buckets, storage node needs to perform several assertions on the sensor data, which may not only reveal whether the sensor data is within the query range, but also leak query result belongs to certain buckets. With the growing times of assertions, the storage sensor nodes will get to know the merging feature of these sensitive data from it.
Besides the above illustrated bucket scheme for the confidentiality of sensed data, there are still another concern that a storage node may return partial portion of the requested data, which constructs an incomplete reply. The previous researches mainly focus on detecting these incomplete replies. Two main kinds of verification schemes has been proposed, one is spatial and temporal crosscheck technique the other is encoding number scheme. The spatial and temporal crosscheck technique can allow the base station to verify whether a query result is complete by examining the spatial and temporal relationships among the returned data. The spatial crosscheck technique is to create some relationships among data generated by sensor nodes in charge by the same master node, while the temporal crosscheck technique is to embed some relationships among data produced in different time periods [6] .
The basic idea of encoding number scheme is to require a sensor to send the storage node an encoding number for a tag if the sensor has no data associated with the tag. In this scheme, the encoding number will be requested by the base station, when storage node claims that a sensor has no data with the tag. The base station is able to verify the received secrets. Whereas the addition of encoding number will cause extra communication costs, especially when accumulated over time in a large scale sensor network [7] .
In wireless sensor networks, secure aggregation is similar to the secure query. It has been clearly described in [8] there are two kinds of secure aggregation, one is aggregate on the plaintext the other is aggregate on the ciphertext. Therefore the homomorphic privacy has been applied in the secure aggregations, for it allows the aggregation directly on the ciphertext. A key stream based privacy homomorphism was proposed in [9] [10] . It applies individual keys on every node and promises provable security with small ciphertext sizes. The idea is to perform a modular addition of a classic stream cipher and with the sensed data. Every sensor uses a different pseudo random stream, for encryption, the plaintext is simply added to the current key of the stream. The base station only needs to subtract the corresponding key stream to obtain the plaintext again. However there are still certain difference between secure aggregation and secure query. Based on the above mentioned drawbacks in the previous schemes, it will provide a specific description of our protocol in the following sections.
III. NETWORK MODEL

A. Model Assumption
1. It assumes that all nodes in wireless sensor network are equal, we no longer classify them into two tiers avoiding storage nodes become attacker's concern. Before the network is working, users choose some sensor nodes as underground party nodes which may be located in the same certain subnet or located in heterogeneous subnets in Internet of things and pre-install particular identification function and identity information etc. for them.
2. During network operating time, these underground party nodes not only communicate and exchange data with other common sensor nodes, but also begin seeking for companion nodes afforded the same mission. The seeking process must be operated secretly, which requires the nodes to conceal their identities from attackers and betrayed nodes. These underground party nodes would make use of the identity-based information hiding method to seeking their companion nodes.
3. After the seeking progress [11] , a hidden underground party network is constructed gradually which is transparent for other common nodes. Once the users assign some vital tasks, then these underground party nodes would work synergistically to achieve them.
B. Secure Query Protocol Description
Executing query upon sensor nodes is a typical application in wireless sensor network. Some nodes may collect confidential information, which causes the requirement for privacy preserving. Therefore during the privacy preserving query process, it hopes to carry out queries while privacy would not be much harmed. In this section, it strives to achieve the above goal under top-k query scenario [12] [13] .
It assumes that there are m underground party nodes in the network. Before the start of top-k query the user need to identify a comparison value x that separates the k-th from the (k+1)-th node by analyzing the past observations of the same kind queries. Then user share this comparison value x with all the underground party nodes in the network by Shamir' (m, n) secret sharing scheme [14] . The task of the underground party node is to seek candidate common sensor nodes within its communication diameter while protecting their confidential sensor data [15] ). In this protocol the underground party nodes need to calculate the approximate degree between the comparison value x and confidential sensor data y i and obtain a number of common sensor nodes with smallest approximate degree. Owing to the hidden identity of these underground party nodes, a common sensor node S i would not know P j 's identity and only regard it as a common sensor node.
The detailed protocol would be described as follows and shown as in Figure 1: 1. Underground party node P j , decomposes its comparison value x into n parts , it uses the random number a i produced by itself to calculate multiplication is the approximate degree between x and y i and subscript ji represents the candidate common sensor node S i neighboring the underground party P j ).
After all the neighborhood nodes have complete the calculations, P j can acquire a list of d ji , which would be used in next section II.C for the top-k query with other underground party nodes. Security analysis: 1. The above secure query protocol is based on the secure multi-party compu ation [16] (a. b. SMC), realizing the privacy preserving goal on both sides of the query parties. SMC techniques enables multiple parties to participate in a computation over their private data without a trust third party and each party could know nothing but the final results of the computation.
2. The operation process of protocol introduces the thought of homomorphic privacy [17] . It strives to find an encryption method, which could execute calculation directly upon the encrypted message and gain the equal results with the same calculation on plaintext.
3. In the first step of the protocol, underground party node uses random invertible matrix M to obscure its comparison value x to prevent compromised sensor nodes and attackers from graspping the comparison value. This mechanism ensures only underground party nodes know the comparison value and participate in secure query process.
4. The third to fifth steps of protocol introduces two random numbers a i and b. Random numbers a i servers as a protection for confidential sensor data on the common sensor nodes, for top-k query shouldn't reveal other nontop-k sensor nodes' confidential sensor data. Random numbers b is used to keep compromised sensor nodes from knowing the calculate result and also ensures the whole computation under a secret transmission circumstance.
5. In the fifth step of the protocol, the sensor nodes
without the process of decryption. As a result of the decomposition and reconstruction of x and i y in the first and second step, the protocol can use the formula on the difference of squares to calculate the distance between these two vectors which is also the gap between the query comparison value x and confidential sensor data y i . 6. In this protocol it realizes homomorphic privacy by adding random invertible matrix and it also proposes a novel approach of approximate matching. Since there will be a variety of information retrievals in the Internet of things, all these queries share the same essence of characteristic string matching. So it adopts the approximate matching approach to calculate the distance between the confidential sensor data and the precalculated comparison value x. Taking the secure requirement into consideration, it just converts the top-k sequencing into the comparison of approximate degree of confidential sensor data, as the privacy preserving foundation for the further query.
C. Secure Query Protocol Description Top-k Query
Algorithm According to the network model described in II.A, the secure top-k query process on the underground parties can be divided into the following two phases:
1. Vertical query: the vertical query phase is performed between one underground party node P j and a number of its neighborhood nodes S i . Using the secure query protocol described in section II.B, P j securely finds out a list of potential candidate sensor nodes' approximate degree d ji , within its communication range.
2. Horizontal query: the horizontal query phase is performed among underground party nodes P j . First it gathers all approximate degree d ji from every underground party nodes, and then sorts them in order. Finally it finds out top-k approximate distances in the whole network, which will satisfy the final query.
According to above two phases, it chooses heap as the data storage structure to realize the vertical and horizontal top-k query in wireless sensor networks. We assume that there are m underground party nodes in the network for secure top-k query and users start a query for the highest or lowest k sensor data in network. So we establish the mathematical model of top-k query algorithm as the triple {<P 1 , P 2 ,…, P j , 1=<j<=m> (1) ,
}. 1. <P 1 , P 2 ,…, P j , 1=<j<=m> (1) indicates that there are m underground party nodes in network. We adopted the seeking algorithm in 4 to build a hidden underground party network before the start of top-k query. These underground party nodes are seen as common nodes from its neighborhood nodes point of view during the vertical query phase. In the horizontal query phase, these underground party nodes would transmit their vertical query results to their trusted companion. (2) indicates that each underground party node P j should at least find ⎡ ⎤ m k candidate sensor nodes within its communication diameter during the vertical top-k query phase. It uses the protocol described in section II.B to calculate the approximate distances d ji , which has filtered some redundant data. Then underground party node P j views these approximate distances d ji as a replacement of confidential sensor data y i to build a max heap with k elements which contains top-k neighborhood nodes S i 'd ji as the vertical query result.
3. <( d i1 ,…,d jk ) 1<=i<=m, 1<=j<=m> (3) indicates that final top-k query result. This set represents the result of horizontal query among the m underground party nodes. During the horizontal query phase one underground party node P j sends its vertical query result to the next trusted companion P j+1 . P j+1 then merge its vertical query result to P j 's max heap. Each of the m parties should execute the same combination process, until all the underground party nodes' vertical query results have been merged into the final max heap, which stores the final top-k query result. The merge process is accomplished by the comparison between P j+1 's d j+1,i and the top element of P j 's max heap. If the d j+1,i smaller than heap's top element, the top element will be replaced by the d j+1,I and the whole heap will be readjusted for a new heap's top element. The process of top-k query using max heap is shown in Figure 2 . In fact, the query algorithm could be realized by some typical sort algorithms such as insertion-sort, bubble-sort, quick-sort, shell-sort ,etc. So it make a comparison and analysis among them. The core code is provided as below: Algorithm 1 Top-k Query 1: dim heapj as the current maxheap of P j 2： dim r as integer r = 0; 3: dim child as integer child = 2 * r + 1 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Simulation and Results Analysis
The simulations reveal the performance of query algorithm described in section II.C mainly focusing on the comparison among Top-k query using heap-sort algorithm with other sorting algorithms. The simulation scenarios could be set as follows: (1) the number of topk query (represented by symbol k) is 50,100,150;(2) the number of underground nodes (represented by symbol m) is range from 1 to 10; (3) four comparing query algorithms are selected as follows: heap-sort tree, straight internet-sort, quick-sort and merge-sort algorithm.
Based on the above simulation scenarios, Figure 3 , Figure 4 and Figure 5 were characterized by the comparison of time efficiency on the four query algorithms when k value is 50, 100, 150 respectively. It is obvious that the heap-sort algorithm would improve the query time efficiency. The protocol must satisfy the following three conditions:
(1) correctness: Probability (sponsor obtained right vertical query result | both query sponsor and receiver are honest)=1;
(2) privacy to query sponsor: Probability (sponsor obtained right vertical query result | query sponsor is honest)=1/2; (3) privacy to query receiver: Probability (no leak of receiver's private data | query receiver is honest)=m/n.
2.Time efficiency of top-k query The number of underground party nodes and the parameter k are significant factors on the time efficiency of top-k query. Based on the above analysis, it performs the simulation test to record the query time on a series of different pairs of <m, k>. Figure 6 represents the relationship between <m, k> and query time. Each swell on the figure indicates query time of a pair of <m, k>. From the above figure we can make the following two conclusions: Using the same parameter k, the query time will increase when each underground party node P j responses less number of sensor nodes for query. And when each underground party node P j responses the same number of sensor nodes for query, the query time will raise with addition of parameter k.
3. Accuracy of the secure query In the adversary environment there exist attackers and semi-honest sensor nodes effecting the accuracy of query.
Due to the misjudgment in seeking underground party nodes, it is inevitable that some malicious underground party nodes may damage the network. Once they are involved in the top-k query, they may illegally leak and obtain the confidential sensor data from common sensor nodes and other underground parties, transfer the fault vertical query result to users ,etc. There is a need for reverifying the identifications of these underground parties during the top-k query, especially for the nodes established an one-way trust relations [11] with other underground parties.
V. CONCLUSION
Concentrating on security thread of Internet of things or sensor networks, it puts forward the "secure query" issue, and makes use of the "underground party" nodes to guarantee the network security by means of trust collaboration and secure multi-party query. Based on homomorphic privacy and secure multi-party computation techniques, the implementation on top-k query is gained secure guarantee and the time efficiency of top-k query is achieved using heap sort algorithm through horizontal and vertical query. By the simulation tests, it compares the performance between Top-k query using heap-sort algorithm and other three typical sort algorithms with different top-k number and it also analyzes the relationship between the time efficiency and the number of underground parties. The future work is to discuss betrayed underground nodes' influence on accuracy.
